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ABSTRACT
In this article, we explore the extent to which a dignitarian ethic can effectively
shape regulatory policy in the area of biomedical practices which involve the use
of human embryos. Drawing on the comparison of how Italy and Germany
deliberated the ways in which assisted reproductive technologies and human
embryo stem cell research should be governed, we explore the conditions
that affect the potential of a dignitarian ethic to effectively shape countries’
policy on these issues. We argue that two factors substantially affect its
success. The first factor is the position of dignitarianism in the country’s
bioethical landscape, that is, whether it is the dominant bioethical perspective
or competes with other perspectives for regulatory relevance. The second
factor is the willingness of the regulators to strike compromises with their
opponents if dignitarianism is not the main bioethical perspective and
competes with other ethical perspectives for regulatory relevance. Building on
our analysis, we conclude by drawing three general patterns of the
relationships between countries’ bioethical configurations and their regulatory
policy.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 December 2016; Accepted 17 January 2017
KEYWORDS Embryo research; assisted reproduction; human dignity; Italy; Germany; comparative law
1. Introduction
Advances in human fertilisation and embryology have brought immense
opportunities for medicine and human health. Technologies such as in
vitro fertilisation (IVF), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and
human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research have contributed to managing
serious health conditions and their further development is now widely associ-
ated with improved health.
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However, such ‘promised futures’1 of improved health have not been the
only vision of what these biomedical advances may bring. Both in philosophi-
cal and ethical debates and in more down-to-earth political discussions, criti-
cism has been mounted that these technologies might lead to the violation and
erosion of human dignity.2 One of the criticisms that ‘dignitarianism’, as this
position has been called,3 raises with respect to these technologies is that they
involve the use of human embryos. Regardless of how human embryos are
regarded, either as full-fledged human persons or as just one of the stages
in the development of human life, their use for medical or scientific purposes
is nevertheless seen as problematic because embryos due to their ‘humanity’
deserve respect and therefore cannot be treated as objects of scientific or bio-
medical research. Hence, the requirement to protect human dignity can imply
the prohibition of commodification, instrumentalisation and commercialisa-
tion of human life. It thus derives from the philosophy of Kant, according to
whom no human life can be used merely as a means to an end but only as an
end in itself.4 Dignitarianism can also include the principle of ‘sanctity of life’
which has religious roots.5 Sanctity of life implies that the dignity of human
life entails its inviolability and sacredness and therefore requires respect for
every human life, including patients in a ‘vegetative state’ and unborn life.6
In the discussion on whether a relevant technology violates human dignity,
the appeal to dignity often acts as a ‘conversation stopper’.7 All the possible
therapeutic benefits that embryo use in medical treatment and scientific
research might offer are regarded as irrelevant if such technological and scien-
tific practices violate human dignity.
However, the extent to which the principle of human dignity can effectively
shape regulatory policy on controversial biomedical issues is in need of
exploration. Specifically, human dignity as described above constitutes the
basis of only one and the most restrictive and disempowering ethic
out of three strands of bioethical reasoning in the so-called ‘bioethical
1Sarah Franklin and Margareth Lock, ‘Animation and Cessation: The Remaking of Life and Death’ in Sarah
Franklin and Margareth Lock (eds), Remaking Life and Death: Towards an Anthropology of the Biosciences
(SAR Press, 2003).
2Leon Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (Encounter Books, 2002);
Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus
& Giroux, 2002).
3Roger Brownsword, ‘Ethical Pluralism and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnology’ in Francesco Fran-
cioni (ed), Biotechnologies and International Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007) 45–70.
4Timothy Caulfield and Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity: A Guide to Policy Making in the Biotechnol-
ogy Era?’ (2006) 7 Nature Reviews Genetics 72.
5This connection between human dignity and sanctity of life was most clearly expressed by John Paul II in
the encyclical Evangelium Vitae, according to which ‘the Gospel of the dignity of the person and the
Gospel of life are a single and indivisible Gospel’: John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (1995) <http://w2.
vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.
html>. This and all websites accessed 9 December 2016.
6Doris Schroeder, ‘Dignity: One, Two, Three, Four, Five, Still Counting’ (2010) 19 Cambridge Quarterly of
Healthcare Ethics 118.
7Kurt Bayertz (ed), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity (Springer Netherlands, 1996).
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triangle’.8 Besides dignitarianism, the bioethical triangle includes liberal,
emancipatory human rights ethics and pragmatic, utilitarian ethics. The
problem hence emerges when these three bioethical perspectives start com-
peting for regulatory relevance, thus urging policymakers to determine
which of the three should shape policy and whether dignitarianism has
some particular importance that could trump the other two ethics.
Furthermore, and to complicate things further, human dignity constitutes
the basis of not only dignitarianism, but also of the human rights perspective.9
These two ethical perspectives build on two different versions of human
dignity. Dignitarianism builds upon the restrictive version of dignity, or
‘dignity as constraint’. As stated above, it is rooted in religious beliefs or it
is based on Kantian philosophy. Therefore, this principle entails that technol-
ogies such as human therapeutic and reproductive cloning, sex selection,
tissue-typing and PGD may erode human dignity because they instrumenta-
lise, commodify and destroy human life. Instead, the human rights perspec-
tive builds upon a liberal version of human dignity, or ‘dignity as
empowerment’, which can be defined as autonomy and self-determination.
This perspective does not treat new biomedical technologies as necessarily
problematic and conditions their legitimacy upon the need to obtain the
informed consent of the concerned patients.
The fact that human dignity underlies both bioethical perspectives, digni-
tarianism and the human rights approach, further aggravates the problem for
policymakers. For example, this problem is particularly pertinent when the
interpretation of laws that build on human dignity is required. In the
absence of a definition of human dignity that settles the matter, it is not
clear whether the legislator implied human dignity as constraint or human
dignity as empowerment. Therefore, even if the intent to protect human
dignity might be uncontested by the parties to the debate, competition
between several bioethical perspectives might still take place due to the inten-
tion of the promotors of different bioethical perspectives to interpret human
dignity in a more liberal or more restrictive way.
Taking the aforementioned problems into account, we explore how, when
and under which circumstances the appeal to human dignity in public debates
around new technological and scientific practices becomes problematic. To do
this, we compare how Italy and Germany discussed and adopted policies on
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) and hESC. Italy and Germany are
commonly used as examples of countries whose restrictive policies on ART
and embryo research have been influenced by the presence of strong dignitar-
ian traditions. However, despite this apparent similarity, the two countries
differ in terms of the timing of the adopted laws and their durability. The
8Brownsword (n 3).
9Ibid.
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German Embryo Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz, hereafter EPA) was
passed in 1990 after five years of deliberation of its text. It has been in force
since its inception and has since only been modified and complemented to
regulate new technologies, including PGD and hESC. By contrast, the Italian
Parliament deliberated the law on medically assisted reproduction (Legge
sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, hereafter Law on MAR) for 20
years after the first bills on IVF had been drafted, and adopted it only in
2004. However, within five years, almost all its restrictive provisions were
repealed by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional. Thus, while the dig-
nitarian tradition led to the adoption of a workable and enduring law in
Germany, the Italian law, similarly influenced by the value of human dignity,
was subject to a lengthy discussion, only to see many of its articles invalidated
as unconstitutional in a short period. Summarised bluntly, in Germany, the dig-
nitarian tradition led to an enduring and workable EPA, while in Italy it led to a
controversial and, ultimately, unconstitutional Law on MAR.
The main argument of our article is that in both countries human dignity
as constraint played a key role in the political debate around the new ART and
hESC research, mainly because these were framed as a potential assault on
human dignity. Yet, the two countries differed in terms of their success to
build their policies regarding ART and hESC research upon the principle of
human dignity. We suggest that two factors were responsible for this differ-
ence. The first factor was whether dignitarianism was the dominant bioethical
perspective in the relevant country. The second factor was the degree to which
the regulators were willing to strike compromises with their opponents if dig-
nitarianism was not the dominant bioethical perspective or was competing
with other bioethical perspectives for regulatory relevance.
While the focus of this paper is on human dignity and the possible difficul-
ties in implementing it through policy, we argue that its conclusions are also
indicative of general patterns of the relationships between particular bioethi-
cal configurations and regulatory outcomes. Indeed, much research has
shown the connection between countries’ bioethical landscapes and the event-
ual regulatory outcomes of the debate on new biomedical technologies.10 This
article contributes to this research in two ways. First, it illustrates the impor-
tance of not only the presence of dominant bioethical perspectives, but also
the ability and willingness of their supporters to strike compromises and to
form coalitions with opponents. Second, it provides a more detailed
account of how exactly such bioethical configurations translate into policies.
In the conclusion, we will draw three broad patterns of how exactly bioethical
configurations may shape regulatory policy.
10Tanja Krones and Gerd Richter, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD): European Perspectives and the
German Situation’ (2004) 29 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 623; Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on
Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton University Press, 2005);
Stefan Sperling, Reasons of Conscience (University of Chicago Press, 2013).
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We shall proceed as follows. In Section 2, we will describe the debate
around the Italian Law on MAR, both its discussion in Parliament and its
invalidation by the Constitutional Court. In Section 3, we shall explore how
the German government discussed the EPA and how it amended it to
account for new technologies such as PGD and hESC. In Section 4, we will
analyse and compare the two countries and conclude why human dignity suc-
ceeded in materialising in the German EPA and Stem Cell Act (Stammzellge-
setz, hereafter SCA) and failed to do so in the Italian Law on MAR. Finally, we
will derive three broad patterns in the relationship between countries’ bioethi-
cal landscape and their regulatory policy.
2. Italy, sanctity of life and the debate on the Law on MAR
Italy opened its laboratories to ART in 1984 when Italian doctors performed
their first IVF procedures. At the same time, the Italian State made its first
attempts to regulate the provision of ART services on its territory. As ART
were still new technologies, raising ethical, legal and safety concerns, the
then Minister of Health Costante Degan instituted an interdisciplinary com-
mission entrusted with exploring various aspects of ART and issuing reports
that could subsequently be used as the basis for a law on ART. The commis-
sion included doctors, scientists, philosophers, and legal scholars and was pre-
sided over by judge Fernando Santosuosso.
The reports produced by the Santosuosso Commission had a rather restric-
tive approach towards ART and embryo research, employing a clearly deon-
tological reasoning.11 IVF embryos were defined as ‘subjects’ whose primary
legal entitlement was the right to life. Therefore, the reports prohibited
embryo selection and the creation of embryos for other purposes than the
initiation of pregnancy, such as scientific research. Finally, they also suggested
that only as many embryos should be created as would be implanted into the
woman, in order to prevent the creation of supernumerary embryos. In case
the implantation of embryos would fail, the non-implanted embryos could be
cryopreserved for later implantation into the same or another woman. In the
latter case, equating embryos with born children, it prescribed that
the implantation should be performed under the supervision of the Juvenile
Court, similarly to the adoption procedure.
The reports of the Santosuosso Commission were not implemented by the
Minister of Health. As Flamigni and Mori ironically suggest, he found them
too liberal.12 Instead, two months prior to their publication, he issued a min-
isterial circular named ‘Limits and conditions of legitimacy of services for
11Commissione Santosuosso, ‘Proposte di disciplina della nuova genetica umana’ (1986) 2 Giurisprudenza
Italiana 33.
12Carlo Flamigni and Maurizio Mori, La Legge Sulla Procreazione Medicalmente Assistita (Net, 2005).
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artificial insemination in the domain of the National Health Service’.13 The
Circular aimed at regulating artificial insemination alone, but also contained
several provisions regulating the procedures regarding embryos. Specifically,
the Circular entirely prohibited embryo cryopreservation and only allowed
the creation of embryos that were required for implantation. However, the
Circular applied to public centres only, thus leaving private centres beyond
its regulatory reach. The adoption of the Circular thus addressed the need
for regulation; however, due to its limited scope of application, it satisfied
this need only partially.
2.1. Sanctity of life, the Catholic/secular cleavage and
underregulation
Simultaneously with the governmental attempts to regulate ART and embryo
research, Parliament also wished to place these under state control. From the
very beginning of the debate, a substantial number of bills, mainly drafted by
the members of Christian Democracy (Democrazia Christiana, hereafter DC),
had been presented to Parliament that called for the prohibition of any type of
clinical and scientific manipulation of human embryos from the moment of
fertilisation, including the creation of supernumerary embryos, their cryopre-
servation, testing, selection based on morphological or genetic conditions,
scientific research and destruction. This prohibition was warranted because,
according to the bills’ drafters, embryos from the moment of fertilisation
were already full-fledged human persons. The belonging of the ‘nascituri’
(‘those to be born’), as embryos have been interchangeably called, to the
moral community of people meant that they possessed human dignity and
that their life was therefore inviolable. For example, the bill presented by
Mino Martinazzoli, president of DC, and Carlo Casini, president of the
Italian pro-life association Movement for Life (Movimento per la Vita, here-
after MpV) and a DC member (Martinazzoli bill), which was to be resub-
mitted many times throughout the debate, explicitly stated that there exist
no interests that could outweigh the importance of preserving human life,
including the life of the embryo.14
Another purpose of these bills, including the Martinazzoli bill, was to expli-
citly recognise IVF embryos as legal subjects and holders of the right to life.
According to the Italian law on abortion, foetuses are neither ‘persons’ nor
legal subjects enjoying the right to life,15 but they do ‘enjoy the inalienable
rights of human beings’ and are thus protected by general art 2 of the
13Circolare 1 marzo 1985, n 100/119657/32.2.14, Limiti e condizioni di legittimita dei servizi per l’insemina-
zione artificiale nell’ambito del Servizio Sanitario Aziendale.
14Camera dei Deputati, Proposta di legge (Norme a tutela dell’embrione umano) n 3486. X Legisatura, 22
dicembre 1988: <http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stampati/pdf/34860001.pdf>
15Corte cost 18 febbraio 1975 n 27, in Giur cost, 1975, p 117 ss.
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Italian Constitution.16 Unsatisfied with the partiality of legal protection of
embryos, the Martinazzoli bill stated that its main goal was ‘to extend the pro-
tection of the right to health and to physical integrity onto the initial phase of
human existence’17 and thereby to recognise human embryos as a subject of
rights, particularly of the right to life. Along with the prohibition against clini-
cal and scientific manipulation of the embryo, the recognition of IVF embryos
as legal subjects, whose primary right was the right to life, was regarded as the
best means for ensuring their protection by the State.18
This framing of embryos as human persons and legal subjects was attacked
by more liberal politicians, largely belonging to the Italian Communist Party
(Partito Communisto Italiano, hereafter PCI). One of the main discursive
strategies they employed was to oppose religion and the state. They stressed
that the issue of an embryo’s moral status was a personal and subjective
value, influenced by one’s religious views, and therefore could not serve as
the basis for secular laws. Instead of focusing on the need to protect
embryos against manipulation, they emphasised other risks that ART raise,
especially if left unregulated, and thereby sought to reproblematise ART.
Specifically, they stressed the need to prevent the commercialisation of repro-
ductive technologies, ‘exploitation’ of patients, infliction of harm on women
and new-borns, medical malpractice and a number of controversial practices
such as eugenics and surrogacy.19
Thus, from the very beginning, the deliberative space on ART and embryo
research in Italy was characterised by two ways in which ART and embryo
research were problematised. These problematisations built on two different
understandings of what should be the basis for laws on ART and embryo
research, that is, the protection of embryos’ dignity and life or, in contrast,
the prevention of medical malpractice and the protection of patients’
health. The presence of these two different problematisations was an
expression of a deep secular/religious cleavage running throughout both
Italian politics and society alike. In the political debates, these problematisa-
tions were advanced and supported by two groups of politicians. DCmembers
supported full embryo protection and an absolute right to life of the embryo.
In their struggle for implementing this principle through laws, they were sup-
ported by the Catholic Church, which retained its role of an influential politi-
cal actor and opinion-maker despite the secularisation of Italian society.20
16Art 2 of the Italian Constitution: ‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable rights of the
person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human personality is expressed. The Repub-
lic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.’
17Camera dei Deputati (n 14).
18Camera dei Deputati. Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIII Legislatura, 395 Seduta, 20 luglio 1998:
<http://leg13.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed395/s030r.htm>
19Camera dei Deputati, Proposta di legge (Norme sulla inseminazione artificiale e sulla fecondazione in vitro),
n 1304. IX Legisatura, 17 aprile 1985: <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/277857.pdf>
20Franco Garelli, ‘La rilevanza concreta e pubblica del cattolicesimo italiano’ (2005) 5 Il Mulino 823.
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Its influence on Italian politics would be further reinforced at the beginning of
the 1990s, when the corruption scandals led to the dissolution of the main pol-
itical parties and emergence of smaller political parties, many of which would
turn to Catholicism in search for their political identity.21 In contrast, PCI
members rejected that human embryos necessarily had human dignity and
instead emphasised the need to protect women’s health. This secular/Catholic
cleavage of the Italian party system was to be the main principle structuring
the debate around embryo use in medical and scientific practices in Italy. Fur-
thermore, running through the entire Italian society alike, it split both lay citi-
zens and the Italian medical and scientific community on the issue of the
‘moral and legal status of the embryo’ and thus on how ART and embryo
research should be regulated.22
One of the main consequences of this cleavage was a difficulty in achieving
consensus on how to regulate ART and embryo research. This led to the inca-
pacity of the Italian Parliament to come up with any law on ART and embryo
research for 20 years. As a result, the Circular remained the only instrument
regulating the provision of ART services and embryo research in the country.
However, because it applied to public fertility clinics only, private centres
remained outside its regulatory reach and instead were subject to self-regulat-
ory governance.23 The self-regulation of doctors practising ART in the private
sector led to a rather liberal approach towards ART. Private Italian clinics
engaged in practising a wide range of ART procedures, ranging from more
widespread ones such as creating supernumerary embryos and embryo cryo-
preservation to more controversial ones such as surrogacy, egg donation, and
the fertilisation of menopausal and single women. Due to this permissibility,
sceptical observers defined Italy as a ‘Procreative Far West’ country.
As a result of this permissive approach towards ART, large numbers of
embryos accumulated in Italian private clinics. This situation had a substan-
tial impact on the approach of pro-life politicians towards ART and embryo
protection. Embryos, besides being framed as full-fledged human persons and
having an absolute right to life, started to be framed as weak, little and still
unprotected little children whose life and health was at stake due to the
‘deviant egoism of those who want to have a child at any cost’.24 Women,
instead, were regarded as the main subjects responsible for transgressing
the established boundaries and putting at stake the interests of IVF
embryos. In the discussion of the law’s text in Parliament, this urged
21Alberto Melloni, ‘Tre fasi nel rapporto fra Chiesa, episcopato e politica’ (2006) 6 Il Mulino 1056.
22Celina Ramjoué and Ulrich Klöti, ‘ART Policy in Italy Explaining the Lack of Comprehensive Regulation’ in
Ivar Bleiklie and others (eds), Comparative Biomedical Policy: Governing Assisted Reproductive Technol-
ogies (Routledge, 2004).
23Isabelle Engeli and Christine Rothmayr Allison, ‘When Doctors Shape Policy: The Impact of Self-Regu-
lation on Governing Human Biotechnology’ (2016) 10 Regulation & Governance 248.
24Senato della Repubblica, Proposta di legge (Norme in materia di procreazione assistita), n 112. XIV Leg-
isatura, 6 giugno 2001, 2: <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/63552.pdf>
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pro-life politicians to emphasise even more strongly the need for an absolute
protection of embryos’ right to life even against the entitlements of prospec-
tive mothers to procreate and have their rights protected.25
The debate around ART and embryo research in Italy was therefore taking
place around a problem that interpretative policy analysis defines as ‘wicked
problems’. According to Fisher, ‘wicked problems’ are problems ‘in which we
not only don’t know the solution but are not even sure what the problem is’.26
Often, wicked problems can emerge in debates around moral and therefore
frequently irreconcilable values. Italian society, split around the issue of the
‘moral status of the embryo’ and hence embryos’ entitlements, was similarly
engaged in discussing what exact problem ART and embryo research actually
raised. Was it the problem of violating the sanctity of life or was it possible
risks to citizens’ health? The inability to reconcile views on the issue of the
‘moral status of the embryo’ led to the failure to adopt a law and to a de
facto permissive regime.
2.2. The debate around the Bolognesi bill, sanctity of life and the
regulation of fertility treatment
The discussion of the co-called Bolognesi bill provides a vivid illustration of
what the idea to protect human dignity conceptualised as sanctity of life
meant in practice. In 1998, largely due to the high-profile case of cloning
the first mammalian animal Dolly the sheep, the government renewed its
attempts to bring ART and embryo research under state control. It assigned
the task of preparing the first draft of a unified bill to the Commission on
Social Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies. The parliamentary coalition at
that moment was centrist-left, which suggested that a more permissive bill
on ART might be adopted. Furthermore, the president of the Commission,
Marida Bolognesi, herself a member of the Italian social-democratic political
party Democrats of the Left (Democratici di Sinistra – L’Ulivo), was known for
her feminist and rather liberal views on matters related to ART and abor-
tion.27 However, as a result of the corruption scandals of the beginning of
the 1990s, the dissolution of the main DC and PCI, and the emergence of a
large number of smaller parties, political parties were no longer representative
of either religious or secular views. Instead, the latter were dispersed across the
entire political spectrum. Therefore, Marida Bolognesi, attempting to attract
the voices of Catholic members of the party, approved a compromise text
of the ‘Bolognesi bill’. It allowed a doctor to create a maximum of four
embryos in one IVF cycle, transfer as many embryos as was deemed
25Ibid.
26Frank Fischer, Citizens, Experts, and the Environment (Duke University Press, 2000) 128.
27Chiara Valentini, La Fecondazione Proibita (Feltrinelli, 2004).
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appropriate to initiate pregnancy, and cryopreserve the remainder; however,
the remaining embryos must be transferred into the same woman in the fol-
lowing cycles. The bill also prohibited embryo research. Thus, it did allow
some form of embryo manipulation such as the creation of supernumerary
embryos and cryopreservation; yet, responding to the voices of the Catholic
members of the party and to their moral reservations about creating supernu-
merary embryos, it limited the number of producible embryos to four and
prohibited embryo research.
However, absolutist voices precluded adoption of the law. Almost immedi-
ately after the bill was passed to the Chamber of Deputies, it was amended by
including the embryo in the list of subjects whose rights the future law had to
protect. In addition, to ensure absolute protection of embryos’ right to life, the
amended bill prohibited embryo cryopreservation and selection, and man-
dated the creation of a maximum of three embryos during one IVF cycle,
all of which, even those holding pathologies, had to be implanted into the
woman’s uterus. Furthermore, pro-life politicians stressed the need to prohi-
bit both women and men from withdrawing consent after the fertilisation of
the patient’s eggs. The main reason for this amendment was to protect
embryos’ right to life from the moment of fertilisation till implantation, if
the couple were to change their mind regarding the implantation of
embryos.28 Finally, pro-life politicians proposed to prohibit PGD. According
to them, PGD would involve the selection of human embryos based on their
genetic profile, or in other words, a ‘eugenic practice’.29 Furthermore, PGD
did not simply treat different forms of life differently, but presupposed the dis-
carding and elimination of embryos that bore pathological genes. PGD thus
represented a double offence against human life: not only did it imply selec-
tion, but it also built upon ‘the affirmation that diseases can be treated by
killing the sick’.30
Liberal politicians criticised these restrictions as not paying enough atten-
tion to the interests of adult Italian citizens involved in ART, especially to
those of women, as women’s bodies were the main object of treatment.
They argued that the prohibition on creating more than three embryos
would force the doctor to perform repeated ovarian stimulations of the
woman, thus raising the risks of such health conditions as ovarian hypersti-
mulation syndrome (OHSS) and ovarian cancer. They criticised the provision
prohibiting withdrawal of consent after egg fertilisation, as it would violate the
principle of informed consent and amount to forced treatment of women.
28Senato della Repubblica, Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIII Legislatura, 852 Seduta (pom), 7 giugno
2000: <http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/6064.pdf>
29Camera dei Deputati, Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIV Legislatura, 421 Seduta, 10 febbraio 2004:
<http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stenografici/sed421/00470b04.htm>
30Senato della Repubblica, Assamblea, Resoconto stenografico. XIV Legislatura, 499 Seduta (ant), 03
dicembre 2003: <http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=14&id=
00114374&part=doc_dc-ressten_rs-ddltit_rdddddl1514eapa&parse=no&stampa=si&toc=no>
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Furthermore, the prohibition of PGD would cause ‘true family tragedies’31
and require ‘from couples a heroism that the law cannot require’,32 as it
would force couples to raise children with severe genetic pathologies or
force women to perform abortion, a much more harmful procedure than
PGD. Yet, all attempts by liberal politicians to reduce the restrictiveness
would fall short in face of the reluctance of pro-life politicians to negotiate
the value of embryo life with other values, including health of the mother.
2.3. Embryo and hESC research
The regulation of embryo and hESC research in Italy was another hotly con-
tested topic. During the discussion of the Bolognesi bill, how embryo research
should be regulated in Italy was a secondary issue, yielding primacy to the
issue of fertility treatment. It got prominence only in 2000, when the
British government decided to amend the Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
ogy Act to allow research on stem cells. This led to a full-blown controversy
on whether hESC research should be allowed in Italy.
First, a brief explanation of what embryonic stem cells are is warranted.
Stem cells were isolated from an embryo and grown for the first time in
1998. They are taken from an embryo at the blastocyst stage, normally five
days after fertilisation of an egg cell. At this stage the embryo cells are pluri-
potent (capable of growing into many but not all types of cells) and therefore
cannot become embryos. This makes them a useful and promising tool for
curing diseases, such as Parkinson’s disease. However, because the extraction
of stem cells from embryos involves their destruction, it raises similar con-
cerns as research on embryos.
Similar to the discussion of fertility treatment, the debate around the legiti-
macy of performing hESC research was first problematised as an assault on
human dignity and a violation of the right to life. The views of discussants,
who included both politicians and scientists, split along the secular/Catholic
cleavage. The proponents of hESC emphasised the therapeutic benefits of
hESC and the potential of such research to provide new cures for presently
untreatable diseases. In contrast, the opponents claimed that hESC violates
human dignity and embryos’ right to life. Similarly to the debate on fertility
treatment, the second group of politicians was backed by the Vatican,
which used the debate on stem cells to further advance its goals on the
‘re-Christianisation’ of Italy.33 Furthermore, in addition to employing
31Ibid.
32Senato della Repubblica, Assamblea, Resoconto sommario. XIV Legislatura, 504 Seduta (ant), 10 dicembre
2003. <http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=14&id=00090770&par
t=doc_dc&parse=no>
33Alberta Giorgi, ‘Ahab and the White Whale: The Contemporary Debate around the Forms of Catholic Pol-
itical Commitment in Italy’ (2013) 20 Democratization 895.
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ethical arguments in the debate, they also argued that hESC research gives
worse results than research on adult stem cells. As Beltrame argued, by enga-
ging in the discussion about therapeutic benefits of different types of research,
Catholic politicians and scientists attempted to shift the debate from the
ethical to the epistemic domain and thus to problematise the debate on
hESC further by calling into question the therapeutic efficiency of hESC
research.34 However, such reproblematisation was indeed anything but
uncontroversial; instead of removing ethics from the debate about hESC,
such reproblematisation indirectly asserted a moral status of the embryo as
a full-fledged human being. Instead, the polarisation was reinforced as it
was no longer only about the moral status of the embryo, but also about scien-
tific evidence and knowledge.
In 2000, the then Minister of Health Umberto Veronesi instituted an ad
hoc commission, including 25 members and presided over by the Nobel
Prize winner oncologist Renato Dulbecco, in order to explore the ethical
implications of hESC research. The final report was published in 2003.35
The members of the commission agreed that hESC provides significant
benefits for medicine. However, they split on the issue of the ethics of using
hESC for medical purposes. While the majority of the Commission’s
members supported the use of surplus embryos for deriving hESC, seven
Catholic members opposed the use of all embryos, even of surplus ones.
They argued that the embryo was a full-fledged human person, whose right
to life and human dignity had to be protected, and no other benefits, including
medical ones, could outweigh the value of its life.
One of these Catholic members was Girolamo Sirchia, an outspoken pro-
ponent of research on adult stem cells. In 2001, when Italy had its parliamen-
tary elections and the Berlusconi-led coalition won, Sirchia was appointed a
new Minister of Health. After he took the post, Sirchia ‘promised’ to institute
a new expert commission that would provide an ‘alternative’ expert report.
Despite the fact that this alternative commission was not established, the
reports of the Dulbecco Commission were not taken into account by the
new Italian government and ended up in a drawer. Instead, immediately fol-
lowing his appointment, Sirchia issued a regulation on funding schemes of
Italian science. The regulation did not include funding for hESC and
covered only adult stem cells. Notwithstanding that no official regulation of
hESC was produced, the governmental decision not to assign funds for
hESC research was indicative of the then government’s reluctance to find
34Lorenzo Beltrame, ‘Disputing the Boundary of Pluripotency: The Italian Public Debate on Amniotic Fluid-
Derived Stem Cells’ (2013) 32 New Genetics and Society 385; Lorenzo Beltrame ‘The Therapeutic Promise
of Pluripotency and Its Political Use in the Italian Stem Cell Debate’ (2014) 23 Science as Culture 493.
35Ministero della Sanità, Relazione della Commissione di studio sull’utilizzo di cellule staminali per finalità
terapeutiche. XIII Legislatura, 28 dicembre 2000: <http://salute.aduc.it/staminali/documento/relazione
+della+commissione+studio+sull+utilizzo_2082.php>
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ethically ambiguous hESC research. The prohibition of conducting hESC
research would be fully implemented with the enactment of the Law on MAR.
2.4. The adoption of the Law on MAR and the institutionalisation of
sanctity of life
In the elections of 2001, central-right parties occupied the majority of seats in
Parliament. After the restrictive text of the bill was approved by the Chamber
of Deputies, the bill was in limbo awaiting discussion in the Senate. The Gov-
ernment appeared in no hurry, however. The situation changed with the
intervention of the Vatican.36 In February 2003, representatives of the Gov-
ernment met with the Vatican clergy on the occasion of the anniversary of
the signing of the Lateran Pacts. The Pope expressed the Vatican’s concerns
with the Government policy such as its support of the war in Iraq and the
implementation of discriminatory laws on immigration. He stressed that
the Vatican could provide political backing if the law on assisted reproduction
in its restrictive version would be approved as soon as possible.37 After this
meeting the position of the Government changed drastically. In December
2003, the Government obtained the approval of the Bill by the Senate. After
the second approval of the Bill by the Chamber of Deputies, on 10 February
2004, it was passed as the Law on MAR.38
In art 1, the Law recognised the human embryo as a right-holder, although
it did not give a definition of the embryo. It allowed access to ART only to
infertile couples if other methods of treating infertility proved unsuccessful.
Further, in art 13, the Law forbade embryo experimentation, prescribed
that clinical and experimental research must be performed only for the sake
of the embryo itself, and forbade the creation of embryos for scientific and
experimental research and eugenic embryo selection. Finally, in art 14 it pro-
hibited the discarding and cryopreservation of embryos, and further pre-
scribed that doctors must not ‘create embryos in a number higher than the
one strictly necessary for a single and simultaneous transfer, and in any
case not more than three’. The only exception to the prohibition of embryo
cryopreservation were serious health issues of the female patient, ‘unforeseen
at the moment of fertilisation’, which allowed doctors to freeze embryos.
However, after solving these health problems, the doctor was obliged to
proceed with embryo implantation. In the same year as it was enacted, the
Law’s provisions were implemented into guidelines of the Ministry of
Health introducing a new medical protocol for performing IVF both for
public and private Italian clinics.
36Valentini (n 27); Patrick Hanafin, Conceiving Life: Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy
(Ashgate, 2007).
37Valentini (n 36) and Hanafin (n 36).
38L 19 febbraio 2004 n 40, Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita.
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Furthermore, three years later, another Circular was issued that specified
what is meant exactly by ‘embryo’.39 As stated before, art 1 of the Law on
MAR did not specify this. As a result, doctors interpreted it as an entity
that is formed with the fusion of the two pro-nucleuses. This means that
from the moment the sperm meets the egg until the fusion of their pro-
nucleuses, the entity was not an embryo, and therefore the restrictive pro-
visions of the Law on MAR did not apply to it. Therefore, doctors could
create a large number of oocytes, fertilise them and cryopreserve these ‘pre-
embryos’, as they have been called by Italian doctors. In this way, they did
not have to repeat the detrimental ovarian stimulation of the woman and jeo-
pardise her health. In addition, this procedure gave comparable pregnancy
rates as a regular IVF. Finally, they could perform polar body biopsy, an
alternative to PGD, although it had a narrower scope of application and
could detect only the mother’s genetic diseases. However, the Circular prohib-
ited these practices. It built its decision on a common line of reasoning
employed in the debate around the Law on MAR, according to which life
should be protected from the beginning, hence with the penetration of the
sperm into an egg and not with the fusion of the two (pro-)nucleuses. As
will be seen later, in Germany both procedures were allowed, which made
IVF significantly less restrictive there.
2.5. The challenge of the Law on MAR, abrogative referenda and
litigation campaign
Predictably, the Law on MAR was not a legal instrument able to function as a
compromise on the issue of IVF regulation. Instead, the debate shifted to
other institutional settings.
2.5.1. Referendum
The enactment of the Law urged citizens who disagreed with the Law to
organise an abrogative referendum against the Law.40 Several questions
were put to vote that concerned the liberalisation of fertility treatment and
the possibility to perform scientific research on supernumerary embryos.
This campaign was supported by many Italian researchers and scientific
associations, such as the Luca Coscioni Association for the Freedom of Scien-
tific Research. They claimed, first, that absolute embryo protection was a reli-
gious principle that could not be the basis for a law in a secular country. In
39Manuela Perrotta, ‘Il Pre-Embrione (Non) È Uno Di Noi: Breve Storia Di Una Innovazione Inter-Organiz-
zativa Tra Istituzioni, Comunità Professionali E Tecnologie’ (2011) 122 Sociologia del Lavoro 194.
40Ingrid Metzler, ‘“Nationalizing Embryos”: The Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Italy’
(2007) 2 BioSocieties 413; Ingrid Metzler, ‘Between Church and State: Stem Cells, Embryos, and Citizens
in Italian Politics’ in Sheila Jasanoff (ed), Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age (MIT
Press, 2011) 105–24.
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addition, they emphasised the principle of scientific freedom that was violated
by prohibiting embryo research. The referendum failed, however, as the
quorum was not met. The Catholic Church influenced this outcome. It organ-
ised a massive campaign against the referendum, calling Italian citizens to
abstain from voting as ‘life cannot be put to vote’. This strategy proved suc-
cessful and only 25.7% of Italian citizens went to the polls. The threat
posed to embryo’s life by referenda and the possibility of repealing the
newly enacted Law was foreclosed.
2.5.2. Litigation
In the same year, the debate around the Law shifted to a different – judicial –
setting. Individual citizens, dissatisfied with the restrictive nature of the Law
on MAR, continued to debate the law’s granting of absolute protection to the
IVF embryo’s rights. They were supported by patient associations and fertility
centres. The plaintiffs’ main legal complaint was that the Law on MAR pro-
hibits PGD and thereby violates women’s right to health. Thus, the relation-
ship of the mother and the embryo, whose opposing interests figured
prominently during the debate on the Law on MAR and eventually underlay
the Law’s text, again became the topic of debate, this time in the courtrooms.
In 2009, only five years after the Law onMAR had been adopted, the Italian
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the Law violates women’s right to
health.41 The question concerned the constitutionality of art 14 of the Law
on MAR that obliged doctors to implant all created embryos simultaneously
and prohibiting cryopreservation. The Constitutional Court concluded that
this restriction could harm women’s right to health, because it significantly
limited the freedom of the treating doctor to apply individual treatment to
every patient, that is, decide on the number of embryos to create and to
implant. As a result, the Constituional Court repealed the restriction that at
most three embryos could be created and implanted simultaneously as well
as the provision forbidding cryopreservation. Henceforth, embryos could be
created in a ‘scientifically justified number’ to ensure good prospects of preg-
nancy and protect women’s health.
Hence, the mechanism of litigation was used by those citizens and their
collectives, including patients and medical associations, who disagreed with
the value system upon which the Law onMAR was based, that is, the principle
of the sanctity and inviolability of life of embryos. Furthermore, it attributed
this value to a wide scope of embryonic entities, including fertilised eggs.
Therefore, the Law on MAR excluded the voices of much of its constituency,
such as patients, doctors, and scientists, whose activities and interests had
been substantially curtailed. Those citizens who disagreed, believing that
41Corte cost, 1 aprile 2009 n 151: <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=
2009&numero=151>
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the law unreasonably prioritised the sanctity of embryo life over the mothers’
right to health, used the mechanism of constitutional law to protect their enti-
tlements. This mechanism was successful and the interests of the patients and
doctors were recognised by the Constitutional Court, repealing the most
restrictive provisions of the Law.42 In fact, such citizen resistance enabled a
parallel and significantly more liberal rewriting of the Law.43
2.6. ART and stem cells: back to underregulation
One consequence of the Constitutional Court’s judgment was that the regu-
lation of ART was again entrusted to doctors themselves. This resulted in a
situation of significant legal uncertainty, which the Italian government
made several attempts to address through regulation. First, the Minister of
Health set up two expert commissions to update the Ministerial guidelines
on ART by 2010. However, up till now, updates have not been published.
Second, liberal parliamentarians introduced a number of bills to regulate
the access of both fertile and infertile couples to PGD. Yet, none of them
reached the parliamentary floor. Thus, the Italian ART sector, having
existed without any state regulations for 20 years only to be suddenly overre-
gulated when the Law onMAR was passed, returned to its pre-law state within
a mere five years. Such issues as whether PGD was legitimate or not, which
health conditions justified access to PGD as well as how, where and for
how long supernumerary embryos should remain frozen did not have clear
and precise legal answers. Some of these questions were addressed by the Con-
stitutional Court when it repealed the prohibition for fertile couples to use
PGD (art 4) and the prohibition of ‘eugenic selection’ (art 13) through its
judgments in 2015.44 Others, such as the destiny of cryopreserved embryos
and the indication of the types of diseases that could be selected out via per-
forming PGD, remained unregulated. Medical self-regulation again became
the main instrument governing the provision of ART in general and PGD
in particular in Italian fertility clinics. However, this mode of governance
came into being not as a result of the State purposefully delegating power
to the medical profession, but rather as a consequence of the State’s failure
to regulate ART and agree on how the wicked problem of the moral status
of the embryo should be incorporated into laws, entailing legal uncertainty
and insecurity, both for patients and the medical community.
42Volha Parfenchyk, ‘Redrawing the Boundary of Medical Expertise: Medically Assisted Reproduction and
the Debate on Italian Bioconstitutionalism’ (2016) 35 New Genetics and Society 329.
43Patrick Hanafin, ‘The Embryonic Sovereign and the Biological Citizen: The Biopolitics of Reproductive
Rights’ in Conor Gearty and Costas Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2012).
44Corte cost, 14 maggio 2015, n 96: <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=
2015&numero=96>; Corte cost, 21 ottobre 2015, n 229: <http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/
actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2015&numero=229>
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A rather similar thing happened with the import of hESC. To begin with,
the failure to repeal the Law on MAR’s restrictive provisions and the fact that
the latter remained in force did not make embryonic stem cell research
entirely impossible. Specifically, the Law on MAR said nothing with respect
to the possibility of importing hESC from abroad. In the absence of a clear
state position, scientists used the loophole in the Law and began importing
hESC from abroad. In their permissive interpretation of the Law, they were
backed by a substantial number of legal scholars.45 However, the legitimacy
of importing stem cells was not supported by many Italians, both lay citizens
and scientists. For example, as Elena Cattaneo, a famous Italian researcher
and supporter of stem cell research, stated in an interview, Italian scientists
were willing to perform stem cell research and made frequent visits to her lab-
oratory.46 However, as they did not wish to be called ‘unethical’ scientists, in
public they denied the fact that they performed such research. In addition,
several organisations, mostly Catholic, insisted that the loophole in the Law
should be interpreted restrictively, accusing the researchers who were import-
ing stem cells of committing a criminal offence, which led to a further worsen-
ing of the societal debate with respect to stem cell research.
Thus, the lack of clear state regulations on stem cells entitled Italian scien-
tists to autonomously decide whether they wished to perform research on
hESC and, if so, how they wished to perform it. This freedom resembles
the self-governance of Italian doctors before the adoption of the Law on
MAR and after the invalidation of its provisions by the Constitutional
Court in 2009. However, the lack of any regulations was far from a positive
outcome. It led to various negative consequences, including the insecurity
which Italian scientists experienced with respect to the legality of performing
research on imported hESC.
2.7. Conclusion
ART and embryo research, including hESC research, were ultimately proble-
matised in Italy as a potential assault on human dignity. Therefore, the Law on
MAR that was eventually adopted represented a solution to the problem that
ART and embryo research raised. This problematisation as well as the concep-
tualisation of human dignity itself as ‘sanctity of life’ emerged as a result of
historical, cultural and political factors, among which the presence of the
Catholic Church as an important political actor played a key role.
However, dignitarianism was not the main perspective in the Italian
bioethics. The requirement to protect human dignity, or sanctity of life, of
45Emilio Dolcini, ‘Ricerca Su Cellule Staminali Embrionali Importate Dall’estero e Legge penale Italiana’
(2006) 49 Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Procedura Penale 450.
46Giuseppe Testa, Elena Cattaneo and Assunta Viteritti, ‘The Italian Pathways of Stem Cells’ (2013) 4 Tec-
noscienza 145.
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embryos was not supported by many lay people nor by decision-makers who
adhered to more liberal views. In addition, the affinity of dignitarianism with
the Catholic teaching raised objections on the part of the secular sections of
Italian society, triggering even deeper disagreements among its supporters
and opponents. Similarly, it entailed absolute and unrestricted protection of
embryos’ right to life even against the competing interests of the future
mother. Embryos included all embryonic entities, including non-viable and
sick ones, from the moment of penetration of the sperm cell into an egg.
Such an encompassing scope of entities that had the right to life substantially
restricted the treatment possibilities of Italian doctors, increased health risks
for their patients and therefore further narrowed down the scope of those citi-
zens supporting this ethical perspective and its implementation in law.
Despite this disagreement, the supporters of dignitarian ethics made little
or no attempt to strike a compromise with their opponents. All attempts to
find a middle-ground solution, such as the one undertaken by Marida Bolog-
nesi, failed. As a result, this prevented the adoption of a law for 20 years.
Italian patients were unprotected and clinics were stuffed with supernumerary
embryos. Furthermore, even after the Law had been adopted, the debate did
not stop but shifted to the courtrooms, and in no more than five years, the
most restrictive provisions were repealed by the Italian Constitutional
Court, hence reverting to a situation of de facto underregulation after a
short period of overregulation.
3. Germany, non-instrumentalisation of life, and the debate on
ART, hESC research and PGD
Similar to Italy, in 1984 the German Government instituted an interdisciplin-
ary commission to study ethical aspects of ART. The Commission was pre-
sided over by the former German Constitutional Court president Ernst
Benda, illustrating the importance of the commission’s work. The resulting
report was restrictive in nature, prohibiting the manipulation and instrumen-
talisation of embryos as a general rule.47 According to it, embryos were enti-
ties worthy of protection because they constituted human life and therefore
possessed human dignity, and the protection of the latter was the consti-
tutional duty of the German State as envisaged by art 1 para 1 of the Basic
Law. Specifically, it indicated that research on embryos might lead to such
horrible scientific practices as Nazi experiments and eugenics and thereby
violate the constitutional principle of human dignity. The report therefore
prohibited germline engineering, embryo and sperm selection, surrogacy,
47Benda Kommission, In-vitro-Fertilisation, Genomanalyse und Gentherapie: Bericht der gemeinsamen
Arbeitsgruppe des Bundesministers für Forschung und Technologie und des Bundesministers der Justiz (J
Schweitzer Verlag, 1985).
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the creation of embryos for scientific research, and the creation of more
embryos than would ultimately be implanted into the woman. Unlike the San-
tosuosso Commission, it did not prescribe that embryos must be necessarily
implanted, and if the woman for any reason changed her mind with respect
to implantation, the embryos could be cryopreserved. Moreover, and impor-
tantly, the Commission allowed research on supernumerary embryos for
‘medical findings of great value’. By indicating that such research must be
of ‘great value’, the Benda Commission attempted to make sure that
embryos are not routinely used in laboratory experiments. However, the
fact that it allowed their use for research meant that embryo protection was
important, yet not absolute.
3.1. Parliamentary discussion, human dignity and adoption of the
EPA
The report of the Benda Commission was not fully implemented when the
German Government proposed its bill in 1989. Its aim was to establish bound-
aries for the use of IVF and genetic engineering when applied to humans,
specifically by prohibiting any kind of manipulation during the initial
stages of human life.48 According to the Government, such a prohibition
was required by the need to ensure the protection of human dignity (art 1
para 1 of the German Basic Law) and the right to life (art 2 para 2). Although
the Government acknowledged the constitutional right to perform research
(art 5), this right was limited by the need to protect human dignity.
To prevent the manipulation of human life at its initial stages and to
thereby protect constitutional principles of human dignity, the Government
included in the list of the forbidden procedures a rather wide range of tech-
niques. They included the creation of embryos for purposes other than initi-
ating pregnancy (in order to avoid the creation of embryos for research
purposes), the use of embryos for scientific research, modifying germlines
or fertilised eggs till the moment of fusion of the nucleuses, the fertilisation
of more eggs than can be implanted in one cycle, cloning, the production
of chimeras, choosing the gender of future children, the use of donor
gametes, and surrogate motherhood. All these procedures were defined as
crimes punishable by prison sentence or fines.
The government bill was also specific in defining what exactly it considered
as ‘human life’ whose dignity the State had to protect. Specifically, according
to art 8 the protection was accorded to embryonic entities from the moment
of the fusion of the gametes’ nucleuses (i.e. zygotes), including totipotent cells
(i.e. cells that can grow into all cell types) that could be derived from an
48Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum Schutz von Embryonen des Bundesregierung, 25
Oktober 1989, Drucksache 11/5460: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/054/1105460.pdf>
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embryo, because a totipotent cell has the potential to become an embryo. In
addition, to be protected by the State embryos had to have the potential to
develop and thus to be born.49 Art 8 of the bill also stipulated that within
the first 24 hours after fusion, when it is not certain whether an embryo
will be able to develop, it is considered to be capable of development and
therefore is also protected by the law. After these 24 hours, it can be
already determined with full precision whether the embryo can develop.
Thus, only embryos capable of developing and hence becoming individuals
were protected by the law.
Finally, the bill sought to protect not only the dignity of embryos, but also
the dignity of women. Thus, the bill criminalised the insertion of embryos into
the woman against her will, as it would violate the principle of autonomy. Fur-
thermore, it acknowledged the possibility that a woman might not want to
have the embryos implanted, or could not have them implanted, for
example, in case of illness. In such cases, the bill allowed embryos to be cryo-
preserved and even destroyed, if the woman did not want to proceed with
implantation.50
The German Senate, the Bundesrat, agreed that embryos should be pro-
tected according to the Basic Law and, similarly to the Government, based
its judgment upon the State’s duty to protect human dignity and human
life. Is also feared a Dammbruch – the breach of a floodgate: if research on
embryos were allowed, then it would only proliferate as new forms of research
goals would appear in the future. However, it asked itself whether embryos
produced to initiate pregnancy, but are not implanted in the genetic
mother and therefore not capable of developing into human beings, should
be banned from research. These supernumerary embryos, according to the
Bundesrat, are not protected by the law because they do not fit within the defi-
nition of embryos stipulated in art 8 of the law, as they do not have the
capacity to develop. So too can it be questioned whether performing
medical research on them would violate human dignity.
Responding to its own quandaries, the Bundesrat deemed a prohibition to
perform research to be necessary, however. Performing research on supernu-
merary embryos could be dangerous because it could lead to a development
that would ultimately be irreconcilable with the ‘objective idea of human
dignity’. Specifically, it could incite doctors to overproduce supernumerary
embryos in order to satisfy the increasing demands of scientists to have
more embryos at their disposal. Additionally, it could incite scientists to
require the right to create embryos for research purposes if they do not
have a sufficient number of supernumerary embryos. Therefore, the
49Hans-Ludwig Günter, Jochen Taupitz and Peter Kaiser, Embryonenschutzgesetz. Juristischer Kommentar
mit medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (W Kohlhammer GmbH, 2014) 354.
50Jochen Taupitz, ‘The German Stem Cell Act’ (2010) 11 German Law Review 1381.
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Bundesrat, though questioning whether research on supernumerary embryos
violates the human dignity of embryos, nevertheless advised the Government
to prohibit research also on supernumerary embryos. This suggestion was
accepted by the Government and incorporated in the bill before it was sent
to Parliament.
During the parliamentary debates, the bill was modified to include a limit-
ation of three embryos for implantation during one cycle in order to prevent
the creation of supernumerary embryos. Three was chosen as a maximum
because medicine at that time did not need more than three embryos to initiate
pregnancy. Another amendment concerned the right to select sperm cells in
order to avoid the transmission of a serious hereditary genetic disease from
parents to children. The proposal of the Government did not contain this
exception because sperm selection based on gender chromosomes was outlawed
out of fear of eugenic practices.51 In the Bundestag the need to allow sperm
selection was proposed by the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) in
order to prevent the transmission of grave hereditary diseases to the children,
e.g. Duchenne disease, or, if the woman would decide to abort a diseased
foetus, to spare her the traumatic experience of abortion. After accepting the
proposed amendments, Parliament voted in favour of the bill and on 1
January 1991, the Embryo Protection Act entered into force.
Hence, the debate around the EPA lasted only five years and was not par-
ticularly controversial. The constitutional value of human dignity and the
shared agreement that human dignity also applied to unborn life, including
embryos, played a key role in the rather speedy enactment of the EPA. As
observed before, the EPA was rather widely supported by the political
parties (apart from the Green Party [die Grünen]).52 This shared agreement
emerged to a large extent due to the reluctance of the entire German
society to repeat the mistakes of its Nazi past, which the inclusion of the prin-
ciple of human dignity in the German Basic Law was meant to prevent.53 This
reluctance led to acknowledging that the instrumentalisation and commodi-
fication of all human life to which practices such as human embryo research,
cloning or gender selection might lead must be prohibited.
3.2. The debate around hESC in Germany
A subsequent debate in Germany, on embryo research and hESC research,
was provoked by the news about cloning Dolly the sheep in 1997 and was
further intensified by announcements about the derivation of hESC in an
51Günther, Taupitz and Kaiser (n 49) 268.
52Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Beslußempfehlung und Bericht des Rechtsausschusses (6 Ausschuß)’, 8 Oktober
1990, Drucksache 11/8057 13: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/11/080/1108057.pdf>
53Sperling (n 10); Herbert Gottweis, ‘Stem Cell Policies in the United States and in Germany’ (2002) 30
Policy Studies Journal 444.
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American clinic.54 In Germany, the EPA did not clearly prohibit research on
hESC, as hESC were pluripotent and not totipotent cells and therefore were
not embryos. Although derivation of hESC involves the destruction of
embryos, a practice prohibited by the EPA, German researchers could
perform research on imported hESC and thus would not violate the general
prohibition against embryo destruction. However, for some this would still
involve the destruction of embryos abroad and therefore violate the spirit
of the EPA. This legal loophole triggered an intense debate in German
society about the legality of performing hESC research in Germany and
how the EPA should be amended to accommodate new research possibilities.
The debate around hESC included many actors, which could be roughly
divided into two groups. The first group, opposing hESC research, was
rather heterogeneous, including Catholics, the Green Party and feminists.55
Unlike Italy, where the Vatican imposed one main frame on embryo use in
ART and hESC, hESC research was problematised in many ways in
Germany. Thus, while Catholics framed it as a problem of embryo dignity
and right to life, feminists emphasised socio-political consequences such as
the use of women’s bodies as raw material for research. On the other hand,
medical and scientific associations such as the German Research Foundation
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, hereafter DFG) suggested that embryo
research was promising because it could bring new cures.56 DFG, specifically,
appealed to a more liberal regulatory approach to hESC and even suggested
changing the EPA. However, compared with opponents of hESC research,
such liberal voices were in a clear minority.
However, in the end, the debate around hESC focused only on the moral
status of the embryo. This result was provoked by an interview of a newly
instated Minister of Cultural Affairs, Julian Nida-Rümelin, in Tagesspiegel
in January 2001. He stated that embryos do not have self-esteem and therefore
do not have human dignity, therefore the latter could not be violated. This led
to public upheaval, for it was in direct contradiction with the publicly held
opinion that embryos do have human dignity, as any other human being
regardless of specific qualities. As a result, President Johannes Rau intervened
with a speech and in sharp words defended human dignity and condemned
the commodification of embryos. He stressed that the value of human
dignity was a lesson learned from the crimes of Nazi-Germany.57 In
54James A Thomson and others, ‘Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts’ (1998) 282
Science 1145.
55Svea L Herrmann, Policy Debates on Reprogenetics: The Problematisation of New Research in Great Britain
and Germany (Campus Verlag, 2009) 169.
56Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Empfehlungen der DFG zur Forschung mit menschlichen Stammzel-
len’ (2001): <http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/download/
empfehlungen_stammzellen_03_05_01.pdf>
57Speech by President Rau at the special meeting of the German Bundestag on the occasion of the mem-
orial day for the victims of national socialism (Rede bei der Sondersitzung des Deutschen Bundestages
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another of his speeches, in May 2001, he claimed that medical research should
never decide when human life should be protected, thereby pointing at the
illegality of embryo research.58
The problem of the moral status of the embryo also underlay the reports of
the two commissions – the Enquiry Commission on Law and Ethics in
Modern Medicine (Recht und Ethik der modernen Medizin) created by the
Bundestag, and the National Ethical Council (Deutscher Ethikrat) created
by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder – set up to explore ethical and legal problems
related to hESC research.59 Calls for a deliberate investigation of hESC were
voiced when a German researcher, Oliver Brüstle, wishing to perform
research on imported human embryonic stem cells, applied for funding at
the DFG and the public debate turned into a political debate. Both commis-
sions stated that the main ethical problem of hESC research was the destruc-
tion of embryos; since for many citizens, embryos had a right to life and
dignity, their destruction might be ethically dubious as it would involve
embryo instrumentalisation for the sake of performing scientific research.
Yet, on the other hand, for other people embryos do not have dignity. They
concluded that the problem of the embryo’s moral status is thus unsolvable,
as it is impossible to reconcile different ethical views. As a result, both com-
missions proposed to prohibit general research on embryos in Germany and
the derivation of hESC in Germany. Yet, they differed with respect to impor-
tation of hESC; whereas the Enquire Commission was against any hESC
research (26 to 12 votes),60 the Ethical Council was in favour of hESC research
by importing them from abroad (15 to 10 votes).61
The political debate on hESC finally led to a debate in Parliament. In
January 2002, three motions (Anträge) on hESC research were discussed in
Parliament. The first was from a politician of the social-democratic party
(SPD). In line with the report of the Commission on Law and Ethics in
Modern Medicine, it argued that human life starts at fertilisation with the
fusion of two nucleuses, therefore it was the duty of the State to protect
human life and human dignity of embryos against misuse and instrumentali-
sation. This requirement entailed the protection of embryos against third
parties who would kill them to produce hESC for research and thus turning
them into mere instruments. No distinction should be made between
aus Anlass des Gedenktages für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus am 26 Januar 2001): <http://www.
bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Johannes-Rau/Reden/2001/01/20010126_Rede.html>




60Deutscher Bundestag, Zweiter Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommission Recht und Ethik der modernen
Medizin (2001) Drucksache 14/7546: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/075/1407546.pdf>
61Nationaler Ethikrat, ‘Zum Import menschlicher embryonaler Stammzellen’ (Dezember 2011) 56: <http://
www.ethikrat.org/dateien/pdf/zum-import-menschlicher-embryonaler-stammzellen.pdf>
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embryos created inside and outside of Germany, therefore import of embryos
and stem cells should also be prohibited.62 In addition, the motion sought to
safeguard the dignity of women, to protect them from being turned into sup-
pliers of raw materials for science, echoing others’ arguments that were used
in the public debate. Though the motion did acknowledge the constitutional
right to freedom of research, it considered this right had to yield to the more
important ‘universal principle’ of human dignity of human beings, indepen-
dent of their stage of development and capabilities.63 The second motion was
from the liberal party (FDP).64 It proposed the use of imported hESC derived
from embryos created to initiate pregnancy. Being of a utilitarian nature, it
suggested that hESC research should be endorsed because it would be ben-
eficial for medical research and promote the public good.65 The third
motion, put forward by CDU/CSU member Horst Seehofer, former Green
Minister Andrea Fischer and by the chairperson of the Law and Ethics of
Modern Medicine Inquiry Commission and SPD member Margot von
Renesse, also allowed the use of only imported hESC.66 However, unlike
the former, it included a substantial number of restrictions. This motion
acknowledged that, on the one hand, hESC were not embryos and therefore
their use was not in violation of the EPA and of the principle of human
dignity. Therefore, the constitutional principle of freedom of research did
not affect any constitutionally protected rights and principles. On the other
hand, hESC research was ethically and constitutionally problematic because
the derivation of hESC involved the destruction of embryos and therefore
led to their instrumentalisation and destruction. Specifically, by approving
the import of hESC, the law would violate the Basic Law if it would create
a demand for new hESC and hence would lead to the destruction of
embryos. To tackle this issue, its promoters suggested to allow the import
of hESC created before the discussions of the motions in Parliament. To be
fully consistent with the ethics enshrined in the EPA, they further limited
hESC research to those that were derived from embryos created to induce
pregnancy and not for research.
The debate around the three motions was highly emotional and lasted five
hours.67 Due to the ethical nature of the issue, the politicians were allowed to
vote according to their conscience and not to their party ideology. The views
62Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag Wodarg, Schutz der Menschenwürde angesichts der biomedizinischen
Möglichkeiten –Kein Import embryonaler Stammzellen, 29 Januar 2002, Drucksache 14/8101, 2–3:
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/14/081/1408101.pdf>
63Ibid, 4.
64Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag Flach, Verantwortungsbewusste Forschung an embryonalen Stammzellen
für eine ethisch hochwertige Medizin, 29 Januar 2002, Drucksache 14/8103: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/
doc/btd/14/081/1408103.pdf>
65Jasanoff (n 10) 197.
66Deutscher Bundestag, Antrag Seehofer, Keine verbrauchende Embryonenforschung: Import humaner
embryonaler Stammzellen grundsätzlich verbieten und nur unter engen Voraussetzungen Zulassen,
29 Januar 2002, Drucksache 14/8102, 2–3, <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/14/081/1408102.pdf>
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split around the issue whether hESC would violate human dignity. The poli-
ticians opposing hESC research emphasised that hESC research would turn
embryos into objects of research and thus violate their human dignity.
They made no distinction between supernumerary and regular embryos,
nor between German and imported embryos. Similarly, they feared that
allowing hESC research would lead to a Dammbruch, in the future allowing
cloning, more exceptions for the import of hESC or production of embryos
for research.68 In contrast, the politicians favouring hESC research stressed
that by setting the cut-off date, the law would ensure that embryos ‘will not
die for German research’.69 As hESC themselves were not embryos, they
were not protected by the Basic Law and therefore research on them would
not violate human dignity.70 They also put forward the promises of hESC
research and downplayed the fear of a Dammbruch, pointing out the strict
conditions for researchers to perform hESC research. At the end of the day,
the third motion got the majority vote in Parliament, with 340 votes in
favour and 265 against.71
Thus, as a general rule, the SCA outlawed hESC research, because such
research would violate the principle of human dignity. Yet, it allowed import-
ing hESC lines if they were created from supernumerary embryos before the
cut-off date, which was set at 1 January 2002. This cut-off date was chosen to
make sure that Germany would not stimulate the destruction of embryos any-
where in the world for German research purposes. Further, the SCA stipulated
that to import hESC, scientists should first prove that the research could only
be performed with hESC and not, for example, with animal stem cells. Lastly,
the law contained a provision that obliged German researchers to submit pro-
posals for hESC research to the Central Ethics Commission on Stem Cells for
approval, before being allowed to actually import stem cells. This mechanism
was intended to act as an additional safeguard against excesses or misuses.
Thus, the constitutional principle of human dignity significantly affected
the outcome of the debate around hESC in Germany. Because it revolved
around a principle that was widely shared, that embryos could not be used
as objects and be destroyed for German research, the German Parliament
managed to overcome the differences in views and quickly pass a law. Tell-
ingly, none of the motions discussed in Parliament called for allowing the
derivation of hESC from German embryos. Despite the attempts of
67Herbert Gottweis, Brian Salter and Catherine Waldby, The Global Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Science: Regenerative Medicine in Transition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
68Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 214. Sitzung, 30 Januar 2002, Plenarprotokoll 14/214
21209, 21213, 21214, 21218: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14214.pdf>
69Sperling (n 10).
70Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 214. Sitzung, 30 Januar 2002, Plenarprotokoll 14/214
21200, 21220: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14214.pdf>
71Thomas Banchoff, ‘Path Dependence and Value-Driven Issues: The Comparative Politics of Stem Cell
Research’ (2005) 57 World Politics 220.
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German scientists, represented by the DFG, to liberalise the policy on embryo
research in Germany and oppose the German Sondermoral to the value of
scientific research, the general consensus about the importance of protecting
the constitutional principle of human dignity was deeply entrenched in
German society. The absence of a deep cleavage like in Italy ensured a
speedy passage of the SCA. By allowing the use of stem cell lines only from
supernumerary embryos initially created for pregnancy and by setting the
cut-off date, the German Parliament thus created an image of a responsible
regulator, loyal to the fundamental ethical principles of German society.
Despite its consensual success, the SCA can be criticised for many reasons.
It can be seen as hypocritical, protecting German supernumerary embryos
from being used as material for stem cells while allowing the use of foreign
embryos for this purpose. Interestingly, in 2008, six years after passing the
SCA, Parliament amended it by choosing a new cut-off date for the use of
embryos, that is, May 2007, which might again suggest hypocrisy of the
German regulators. Furthermore, it can also be criticised for creating regulat-
ory incoherence through combining in the same regulatory order two contra-
dictory value systems.72 One of them builds upon the restrictive ‘dignity as
constraint’ value, whereas the other has a more utilitarian nature, allowing
German scientists to reap the benefits from research on embryos that in
any case will be turned into hESC lines in countries with more liberal policies.
Finally, a potential criticism is that by gradually increasing the number of such
‘exceptions’, the German regulator may in the long run betray the very idea of
human dignity.73 However, exactly this alleged ‘hypocrisy’ or ‘incoherence’
enabled the German regulator to pass the SCA and regulate hESC research
on its territory. Unlike Italy, which came to a de facto liberal outcome on
the regulation of hESC research as a result of a failure to compromise,
Germany allowed the import of stem cells after a deliberate negotiation
process and as a result of a willingness to account for different ethical views
of its citizenry.
3.3. The debate on PGD in Germany
It was generally considered that the EPA, though not explicitly naming PGD,
did not allow its use because the selection of embryos would violate the con-
stitutional principle of human dignity upon which the EPA was built.
However, since as early as the mid-1990s, German society had been deliber-
ating the possibility to legitimise PGD. The main strategy for this was to
attempt to reproblematise it. Specifically, according to the German Society
72Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2008).
73Kathrin Braun, ‘From Ethical Exceptionalism to Ethical Exceptions: The Rule and Exception Model and the
Changing Meaning of Ethics in German Bioregulation’ (2016) Developing World Bioethics doi:10.1111/
dewb.12103.
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of Human Genetics (GfH), the prohibition of PGD was not consistent with
parents’ interests as it would force pregnant women to perform abortions.74
A similar conclusion was reached by the ethics committee of a clinic in
Lübeck, which was approached by two clinicians for advice on the issue of
PGD. According to this committee, the EPA prohibited PGD. However, it
wondered if such a prohibition would be ethical if it would force women to
perform harmful abortions and thus create negative impacts upon their
health.75 Finally, in 2000 the German Medical Association (Bundesärztekam-
mer, hereafter BÄK) published a discussion paper on PGD.76 The BÄK
framed the problem of PGD as a conflict between the embryo’s right to life
and the rights of parents, and concluded that because PGD was needed to
protect the health of the future mother, it would not amount to eugenic prac-
tice and hence should be allowed.
In 2010, a crucial event happened affecting the legality of PGD in
Germany. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter the
BGH) had to decide upon a case of a German gynaecologist who performed
PGD to prevent the passing of genetic disorders if these would lead to miscar-
riage, stillbirth or early death of the child. The gynaecologist performed three
PGD operations and later turned himself in to the authorities. The BGH,
however, acquitted him.77 First, the BGH concluded that all the doctor’s
actions did not involve the misuse of embryos, strictly forbidden by the
EPA. Instead, he performed PGD to make pregnancies possible, the only
purpose that allowed the use of embryos according to the EPA. Second, it
took into account that the EPA permitted sperm selection to avoid the cre-
ation of sick embryos. Drawing upon this analogy, it equated embryos with
sperm cells and concluded that if sperm selection was allowed, then
embryo selection should be allowed as well to prevent the passing of
genetic disorders. Third, the German regulation on abortion permitted a ter-
mination if the foetus carried certain kinds of pathologies. Therefore, for the
Court it was unreasonable to forbid PGD, given that abortion was signifi-
cantly more intrusive and damaging than PGD. As a result, the Court
decided that PGD was not a criminal offence under the EPA.
The ruling created legal uncertainty with respect to the legality of perform-
ing PGD in Germany and Parliament was quick to remove it. During the Par-
liamentary debate around PGD, three types of bills were presented. The first
proposal, put forward by Green Party politician Katrin Göring-Eckardt,
entirely prohibited PGD.78 Its proponents argued that according to the
74Herrmann (n 55).
75Ibid.
76Bundesärztekammer, Diskussionsentwurf zu einer Richtlinie zur Präimplantationsdiagnostik, in Sigrid
Graumann (ed), Die Genkontroverse. Grundpositionen (Herder Spektrum, 2001) 157.
77Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), Urteil vom 6 Juli 2010 – 5 StR 386/09.
78Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zum Verbot der Präimplantationsdiagnostik, 11 April 2011,
Drucksache 17/5450: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705450.pdf>
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values of the Basic Law, every human being has the same dignity and the State
cannot make decisions on which life is worthy of living and which is not, as it
can lead to eugenic practices. This value system would be jeopardised if PGD
were allowed. The second bill was put forward by SPD politician Peter René
Röspel. It allowed PGD only to check the presence of serious genetic heredi-
tary diseases in the embryo if these would lead to stillbirth, miscarriage or
death of the baby in the first year of life and thus was similar to the BGH
ruling.79 The third proposal, proposed by FDP politician Ulrike Flach, was
substantially more liberal. It allowed PGD to perform screening both to
check the presence of genetic abnormalities if they would lead to miscarriage,
stillbirth or the death of the baby in the first year and when the parents have a
severe hereditary disease with a risk of at least 25% of passing it on to their
offspring.80
In 2011, only one year after the BGH ruling, Parliament voted for the third
proposal, thus allowing PGD in both cases, that is, to check for genetic
abnormalities in the baby if they would lead to miscarriage, stillbirth or
death of the baby in the first year and when the parents have a severe heredi-
tary disease. The amendment was incorporated into the EPA. According to
the new art 3a of the EPA, PGD remained a crime. However, it was not unlaw-
ful to perform PGD to prevent passing a serious hereditary disease to the
embryo, including if such a disease would lead to stillbirth or miscarriage.
The amendment also instructed that the woman had to undergo counselling
beforehand and stipulated the institution of ethics committees that had to
provide oversight over PGD.
During the parliamentary debates in the Bundestag, the politicians oppos-
ing PGD argued that the selection of embryos for implantation violated
human dignity as it constituted eugenic practice.81 Echoing the fear of Nazi
eugenics, they stressed that the State should not decide which life would be
worth living (lebenswert) and which life would not be (lebensunwert). In con-
trast, the politicians favouring PGD argued that allowing PGD would give
German families a chance to avoid the psychological and social burden of
raising children with severe genetic pathologies. They engaged in telling per-
sonal stories about people they knew whose lives were affected by similar
experiences – for example, experiences from burying a baby of a few days
old to the woman who lost six brothers due to the same genetic disease.82
79Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur begrenzten Zulassung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik
(Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz – PräimpG), 12 April 2011, Drucksache 17/5452: <http://dipbt.
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/054/1705452.pdf>
80Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (Präimplan-
tationsdiagnostikgesetz – PräimpG), 12 April 2011, Drucksache 17/5451: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/17/054/1705451.pdf>
81Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 105. Sitzung, 14 April 2011, Plenarprotokoll 17/105
11947, 11954, 11956, 11967: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17105.pdf>
82Ibid, 11946, 11955, 11972.
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More importantly they stressed that is was not a question of a life worth living
or not, but having the possibility for parents to have a baby capable of living
(lebensfähig).
Interestingly, in their speeches, they made no reference to human dignity
but chose a different technique. They stressed the obligation of the State to
protect not (only) unborn life, but (also) adult German (female) citizens
from heavy physical or mental burdens that might result from performing
an abortion or raising a child with a severe genetic disease, allowing them
to have a baby capable of living. Put differently, the main strategy of the
German regulators in legitimising PGD was its reproblematisation. Instead
of discussing how exactly PGD should be accommodated in order to be con-
sistent with the German constitutional order and the principle of human
dignity, the supporters of PGD ignored the discussion of the principle of
human dignity altogether. Rather, they emphasised how the prohibition
would affect German couples who would be forced to raise children with
severe genetic pathologies or women who would be forced to perform an
abortion. In other words, they emphasised that the German state was
obliged to care not only about the dignity of embryos but also about the
dignity of adult women. Hence, dignity as empowerment was brought to
the fore in the debate on PGD, implying the need for a more liberal regulation
of new biomedical practices.
And yet, the constitutional ideal of human dignity as constraint was not
entirely absent. The amendment introduced in the EPA is reminiscent of
how the German Constitutional Court allowed abortion.83 As a general
rule, abortion was considered a crime as performing it would violate
human dignity. However, the State was obliged to take into account and
protect not only the right to life of unborn foetuses, but also the life and
health of women. Unlike human dignity, according to the German Basic
Law, the embryo’s right to life was not absolute, as according to the Basic
Law it could be limited by law. Therefore, the Constitutional Court, while
maintaining the definition of abortion as a crime, made it unpunishable if
the woman would undergo counselling, and if her health condition would
be affected by the embryo’s pathologies. Thus, the Court made abortion poss-
ible, yet without abandoning the State’s commitment to protecting human
dignity.
In a rather similar way, the German Parliament allowed PGD. As a general
rule, it recognised PGD as a crime. PGD was still regarded as a practice
incompatible with the German Sondermoral and the principle of human
dignity. However, by redefining the scope of subjects whose dignity the
State must protect, the proponents of PGD managed to carve out a space
83Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverfGE), Urteil vom 28. Mai 1993, BVerfGE 88, 203.
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for PGD in the German constitutional arrangements, to protect the interests
of adult citizens alongside the interests of unborn life.
3.4. Conclusion
ART and embryo research, including hESC research, are problematised in
Germany as a potential violation of the constitutional principle of human
dignity, enshrined in art 1 of the German Basic Law. Whereas the Basic
Law itself says nothing concerning the legitimacy of embryo manipulation
and whether it violates human dignity, due to historical reasons, and
mainly to the Nazi past of Germany, embryo research and experimentation
were problematised as an assault on human dignity. Similarly, due to the
memory of Nazi experiments, human dignity was conceptualised as the prin-
ciple of non-instrumentalisation of human life. This implied that unborn life
enjoyed strong protection in Germany. However, it was not absolute and did
not entail an unrestricted right to life. This conceptualisation affected the way
in which the EPA defined human life that the State was obliged to protect, that
is, as human life from the moment of the fusion of the egg and the sperm and
having the ‘capacity to develop’.
The memory of the Nazi past was also the reason why there was a general
consensus in German society about the need to prohibit embryo experimen-
tation out of respect for human dignity. This general consensus underlay a
speedy and rather unproblematic adoption of the EPA and a broad endorse-
ment of its restrictive nature. Importantly, there was an agreement with
respect to another value that also played an important role in the speedy
passage of the Law and in its support. Of the utmost importance was the
consent of women, needed to prevent forced medical treatments. Hence,
the EPA already contained the two bioethical principles, dignity as constraint,
underwriting the general prohibition of embryo experimentation, and dignity
as empowerment, prohibiting forced IVF treatment and allowing women to
withdraw their consent any time during the treatment. These two bioethical
perspectives enjoyed wide societal support making the EPA almost entirely
criticism-proof.
With the advent of new technologies, the extent to which the principle of
human dignity encompassed embryo protection started to be questioned. The
proponents of hESC research emphasised that the import of hESC from
abroad would not violate human dignity if strong norms against such viola-
tion were embedded in the law and stressed another constitutional principle,
the freedom of research. Similarly, the proponents of PGD emphasised the
need to prevent negative impacts of raising children with severe genetic path-
ologies on women’s lives, thereby invoking the dignity as empowerment prin-
ciple. Importantly, the proponents of both technological advancements did
not argue against the need to protect embryos from scientific experimentation
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as such. At stake was the degree to which the competing interests and values
could and should be taken into account.
The SCA that was eventually adopted together with the amendments to the
EPA on PGD illustrate that a well-debated compromise was struck between
the competing bioethical perspectives. Hence, the German regulator, while
staying faithful to its constitutional values and historical memory, neverthe-
less approached and solved the problem of ‘regulatory connection’84 and
therefore stayed in touch with new techno-scientific realities, keeping them
under its vigilant watch. In addition, by embracing different views on the
ethical legitimacy of new technologies, it took into account different norma-
tive positions of its constituency.
4. Discussion and conclusion
The comparison between Italy and Germany provides a good illustration
when the appeal to human dignity in public debates on new technologies
involving the use of embryos becomes problematic. First, the appeal to
human dignity raises significant controversy when dignitarianism does not
constitute the main bioethical perspective in the country at stake. Specifically,
the comparison of the policies of Italy and Germany showed differences in
terms of their efficiency and durability exactly because of a different degree
of support that this principle enjoyed in the two countries. Seeking not to
repeat the horrors of Nazi Germany, German society broadly accepted that
the regulation of new biomedical technologies must be in conformity with
the principle of human dignity, conceptualised as the principle of non-instru-
mentalisation of human life. This enabled the speedy enactment of laws reg-
ulating ART and hESC research, which were seldom contested after their
enactment. In contrast, in Italy, due to the secular/religious cleavage, only
the religious part of Italian society fully supported the human dignity of
embryos, conceptualised as sanctity of life. Moreover, the attempts of
Italian politicians to embed this principle into law were rejected as inap-
propriate in a country where the Church is separated from the State. As a
result, it led to a regulatory stalemate and underregulation of ART, both in
the long period before the adoption of the Law on MAR and after the invali-
dation of the most restrictive provisions of the Law by the Constitutional
Court. A similar underregulation also characterised the legal situation with
hESC.
Second, the appeal to human dignity raises problems when the supporters
of this principle may not be willing to compromise with their opponents. As
has been demonstrated, the supporters of sanctity of life in Italy refused to
seek out compromises with the supporters of more liberal views on ART
84Brownsword (n 72).
LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 31
and hESC research. In a country where this principle is not widely shared, the
absolutism further exacerbated the controversy. In Germany, in contrast, the
parties were open to compromises. Human dignity remained the main prin-
ciple governing the development of policies. However, those who appealed to
other principles such as freedom of research and dignity as empowerment also
managed to have their position accommodated by law. Thus, ‘human dignity
as constraint’ was combined with ‘human dignity as empowerment’ in the
German policy on PGD. Although the outcome achieved by the German reg-
ulator may be criticised as incoherent, it had the advantage that it led to the
closure of the controversy and the establishment of a tight and reliable mech-
anism of oversight on new technologies. In addition, through combining
different perspectives, the German regulator undertook an attempt to stay
in touch with techno-scientific realities and hence address the problem of
‘regulatory connection’.85 More importantly, such an outcome provided suf-
ficient certainty for all the involved actors about their entitlements, duties and
responsibilities.
While the focus of this paper is on human dignity, we suggest that its con-
clusions can be also indicative of general patterns of the relationships between
particular bioethical configurations and countries’ policies on new biomedical
practices. In what follows, we will draw three broad patterns of how exactly
bioethical configurations may shape regulatory policy. Clearly, in teasing
out these patterns, we acknowledge that they do not work as uniform and
rigid templates for how bioethical sensibilities of the relevant country shape
its policy and therefore they must be applied with the utmost caution in
further analysis. However, by drawing them we believe that they can make
further research on this topic more analytically tractable and therefore act
as useful methodological resources for other scholars exploring the connec-
tion between countries’ bioethical landscapes and their regulatory policy.
The first pattern is the correspondence of the regulatory environment of a
country with the country’s dominant bioethical perspective. Put differently, if
a specific bioethical perspective clearly dominates the bioethical landscape,
the regulatory policy will reflect this perspective. Great Britain, where the uti-
litarian perspective is dominant, can exemplify this pattern. The second
pattern is that in those countries where (a) several bioethical perspectives
co-exist and (b) the supporters of competing perspectives are willing to
make coalitions or strike compromises, the regulatory environment will
reflect the terms of the compromise or coalition. We suggest that Germany
might instantiate this principle. Although the ‘dignity as constraint’ principle
remained the main regulatory principle, regulatory policy nevertheless
accommodated ‘the dignity as empowerment’ perspective. Third, in countries
where (a) several bioethical perspectives compete for regulatory relevance and
85Ibid.
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(b) their proponents are not willing to form coalitions or strike compromises,
the regulatory outcome will be unpredictable and uncertain. We suggest that
Italy followed this pattern; the reluctance of Catholic politicians to strike com-
promises with respect to the regulation of ART and hESC research led to sig-
nificant periods of underregulation and legal uncertainty.
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